Antifederalist No. 51

DO CHECKS AND BALANCES REALLY SECURE
THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE?


    This satire is from a pamphlet
of "ARISTOCROTIS," The Government of
Nature Delineated; Or An Exact
Picture of the New Federal
Constitution (Carlisle, PA, 1788) 


     The present is an active
period.  Europe is in a ferment
breaking their constitutions;
America is in a similar state,
making a constitution.  For this
valuable purpose a convention was
appointed, consisting of such as
excelled in wisdom and knowledge,
who met in Philadelphia last May. 
For my own part, I was so smitten
with the character of the members,
that I had assented to their
production, while it was yet in
embryo.  And I make no doubt but
every good republican did so too. 
But how great was my surprise, when
it appeared with such a venerable
train of names annexed to its tail,
to find some of the people under
different signatures-such as
Centinel, Old Whig, Brutus, etc. -
daring to oppose it, and that too
with barefaced arguments, obstinate
reason and stubborn truth.  This is
certainly a piece of the most
extravagant impudence to presume to
contradict the collected wisdom of
the United States; or to suppose a
body, who engrossed the whole wisdom
of the continent, was capable of
erring.  I expected the superior
character of the convention would
have secured it from profane sallies
of a plebeian's pen; and its
inherent infallibility debarred the
interference of impertinent reason
or truth.  It was too great an act
of condescension to permit the
people, by their state conventions,
"to assent and ratify," what the
grand convention prescribed to them;
but to inquire into its principles,
or investigate its properties, was a
presumption too daring to escape
resentment.  Such licentious conduct
practised by the people, is a
striking proof of our feeble
governments, and calls aloud for the
pruning knife, i.e., the
establishment of some proper plan of
discipline.  This the convention,
in the depth of their united wisdom
hath prescribed, which when
established, will certainly put a
stop to the growing evil.  A
consciousness of this, is, no doubt,
the cause which stimulates the
people to oppose it with so much
vehemence.  They deprecate the idea
of being confined within their
proper sphere; they cannot endure
the thought of being obliged to mind
their own business, and leave the
affairs of government to those whom
nature hath destined to rule.  I say
nature, for it is a fundamental
principle, as clear as an axiom,
that nature hath placed proper
degrees and subordinations amongst
mankind and ordained a few(1) to
rule, and many to obey.  I am not
obliged to prove this principle
because it would be madness in the
extreme to attempt to prove a self-
evident truth. 

(1) If any person is so stupidly
dull as not to discern who these few
are, I would refer such to nature
herself for information.  Let them
observe her ways and be wise.  Let
them mark those men whom she hath
endued with the necessary
qualifications of authority; such
as the dictatorial air, the
magisterial voice, the imperious
tone, the haughty countenance, the
lofty look, the majestic mien.  Let
them consider those whom she hath
taught to command with authority,
but comply with disgust; to be fond
of sway, but impatient of control;
to consider themselves as Gods, and
all the rest of mankind as two
legged brutes.  Now it is evident
that the possessors of these divine
qualities must have been ordained by
nature to dominion and empire; for
it would be blasphemy against her
supreme highness to suppose that she
confers her gifts in vain.  Fortune
hath also distinguished those upon
whom nature hath imprinted the
lineaments of authority.  She hath
heaped her favors and lavished her
gifts upon those very persons whom
nature delighteth to honor.  Indeed,
instinct hath taught those men that
authority is their natural right,
and therefore they grasp at it with
an eagerness bordering on rapacity.

     But with all due submission to
the infallible wisdom of the grand
convention, let me presume to
examine whether they have not, in
the new plan of government,
inviolably adhered to this supreme
principle. . . . 
     In article first, section
first, of the new plan, it is
declared that "all legislative
powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United
States which shall consist of a
Senate"-very right, quite agreeable
to nature and House of
Representatives"-not quite so right. 
This is a palpable compliance with
the humors and corrupt practices of
the times.  But what follows in
section 2 is still worse: "The House
of Representatives shall be composed
of members chosen every second year
by the people of the several
states."  This is a most dangerous
power, and must soon produce fatal
and pernicious consequences, were it
not circumscribed and poised by
proper checks and balances.  But in
this is displayed the unparalleled
sagacity of the august convention:
that when such bulwarks of prejudice
surrounded the evil, so as to render
it both difficult and dangerous to
attack it by assault and storm, they
have invested and barricaded it so
closely as will certainly deprive it
of its baneful influence and prevent
its usual encroachments.  They have
likewise stationed their miners and
sappers so judiciously, that they
will certainly, in process of time,
entirely reduce and demolish this
obnoxious practice of popular
election.  There is a small thrust
given to it in the body of the
conveyance itself.  The term of
holding elections is every two
years; this is much better than the
detestable mode of annual elections,
so fatal to energy.  However, if
nothing more than this were done, it
would still remain an insupportable
inconvenience.  But in section 4 it
is provided that congress by law may
alter and make such regulations with
respect to the times, places, and
manner of holding elections, as to
them seemeth fit and proper.  This
is certainly a very salutary
provision, most excellently adapted
to counterbalance the great and
apparently dangerous concessions
made to the plebeians in the first
and second sections.  With such a
prudent restriction as this they are
quite harmless: no evil can arise
from them if congress have only the
sagacity and fortitude to avail
themselves of the power they possess
by this section.  For when the
stated term (for which the primary
members was elected) is nigh
expired, congress may appoint [the]
next election to be held in one
place in each state; and so as not
to give the rabble needless disgust,
they may appoint the most central
place for that purpose.  They can
never be at a loss for an ostensible
reason to vary and shift from place
to place until they may fix it at
any extremity of the state it suits. 
This will be the business of the
senate, to observe the particular
places in each state, where their
influence is most extensive, and
where the inhabitants are most
obsequious to the will of their
superiors, and there appoint the
elections to be held.  By this
means, such members will be returned
to the house of representatives (as
it is called) as the president and
senate shall be pleased to
recommend; and they no doubt will
recommend such gentlemen only as are
distinguished by some peculiar
federal feature-so that unanimity
and concord will shine conspicuous
through every branch of government.  
This section is ingeniously
calculated, and must have been
intended by the convention, to
exterminate electioneering entirely. 
For by putting the time of election
in the hands of congress they have
thereby given them a power to
perpetuate themselves when they
shall find it safe and convenient to
make the experiment.  For though a
preceding clause says, "that
representatives shall be chosen for
two years, and senators for six
years," yet this clause being
subsequent annuls the former, and
puts it in the power of congress,
(when some favorable juncture
intervenes) to alter the time to
four and twelve years.  This cannot
be deemed an unconstitutional
stretch of power, for the
constitution in express terms puts
the time of holding elections in
their power, and certainly they are
the proper judges when to exert that
power.  Thus by doubling the period
from time to time, its extent will
soon be rendered coeval with the
life of man.  And it is but a very
short and easy transition from this
to hereditary succession, which is
most agreeable to the institutions
of nature, who in all her works,
hath ordained the descendant of
every species of beings to succeed
its immediate progenitor, in the
same actions, ends and order.
     The indefatigable laborious ass
never aspires to the honors, nor
assumes the employment of the
sprightly warlike steed, nor does he
ever pretend that it is his right to
succeed him in all his offices and
dignities, because he bears some
resemblance to the defunct in his
figure and nature.  The llama,
though useful enough for the
purposes for which he was intended
by nature, is every way incompetent
to perform the offices of the
elephant; nor does he ever pretend
to usurp his elevated station. 
Every species of beings, animate and
inanimate, seem fully satisfied with
the station assigned them by nature. 
But perverse, obstinate man, he
alone spurns at her institutions,
and inverts her order.' He alone
repines at his situation, and
endeavors to usurp the station of
his superiors.  But this digression
has led me from the subject in hand.
. . .

(2) This is only to be understood of
the inferior class of mankind.  The
superior order have aspiring
feelings given them by nature, such
as ambition, emulation, etc., which
makes it their duty to persevere in
the pursuit of gratifying these
refined passions.

     The next object that presents
itself is the power which the new
constitution gives to congress to
regulate the manner of elections. 
The common practice of voting at
present is by ballot.  By this mode
it is impossible for a gentleman
to know how he is served by his
dependent, who may be possessed of a
vote.  Therefore this mode must be
speedily altered for that viva voce,
which will secure to a rich man all
the votes of his numerous dependents
and friends and their dependents. 
By this means he may command any
office in the gift of the people,
which he pleases to set up for. 
This will answer a good end while
electioneering exists; and will
likewise contribute something
towards its destruction.  A
government founded agreeable to
nature must be entirely independent;
that is, it must be beyond the reach
of annoyance or control from every
power on earth, Now in order to
render it thus, several things are
necessary.
     1st.  The means of their own
support must be within the immediate
reach of the rulers.  For this
purpose they must possess the sole
power of taxation.  As this is a
principal article, it ought, in all
things to have preeminence; and
therefore the convention has placed
it in front.  "The congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises," so
that they shall never be at a loss
for money while there is a shilling
on the continent, for their power to
procure it is as extensive as their
desires; and so it ought, because
they can never desire any thing but
is good and salutary.  For there is
no doubt but the convention will
transfer their infallibility to the
new congress, and so secure them
from doing evil.  This power of
taxation will answer many valuable
purposes, besides the support of
government.  In the first place, in
the course of its operation, it will
annihilate the relies of the several
state legislators.  For every tax
which they may lay, will be deemed
by congress an infringement upon the
federal constitution, which
constitution and the laws of
congress being paramount to all
other authority, will of consequence
nullify every inferior law which the
several states may think proper to
enact, particularly such as relate
to taxes; so that they being
deprived of the means of existence,
their pretended sovereignties will
gradually finger away.
     2dly.  It will create and
diffuse a spirit of industry among
the people.  They will then be
obliged to labor for money to pay
their taxes.  There will be no
trifling from time to time, as is
done now.  The new government will
have energy sufficient to compel
immediate payment. 
     3dly.  This will make the
people attend to their own business,
and not be dabbling in politics -
things they are entirely ignorant
of; nor is it proper they should
understand.  But it is very probable
that the exercise of this power may
be opposed by the refractory
plebeians, who (such is the
perverseness of their natures) often
refuse to comply with what is
manifestly for their advantage.  But
to prevent all inconvenience from
this quarter the congress have power
to raise and support armies.  This
is the second thing necessary to
render government independent.  The
creatures who compose these armies
are a species of animals, wholly at
the disposal of government; what
others call their natural rights
they resign into the hands of their
superiors-even the right of
self-preservation (so precious to
all other beings) they entirely
surrender, and put their very lives
in the power of their masters. 
Having no rights of their own to
care for, they become naturally
jealous and envious of those
possessed by others.  They are
therefore proper instruments in the
hands of government to divest the
people of their usurped rights.  But
the capital business of these armies
will be to assist the collectors of
taxes, imposts, and excise, in
raising the revenue; and this they
will perform with the greatest
alacrity, as it is by this they are
supported; but for this they would
be in a great measure useless; and
without this they could not exist. .
. .
     From these remarks, I think it
is evident, that the grand
convention hath dexterously provided
for the removal of every thing that
hath ever operated as a restraint
upon government in any place or age
of the world.  But perhaps some weak
heads may think that the
constitution itself will be a check
upon the new congress.  But this I
deny, for the convention has so
happily worded themselves, that
every part of this constitution
either bears double meaning, or no
meaning at all; and if any
concessions are made to the people
in one place, it is effectually
cancelled in another-so that in fact
this constitution is much better and
gives more scope to the rulers than
they durst safely take if there was
no constitution at all.  For then
the people might contend that the
power was inherent in them, and that
they had made some implied reserves
in the original grant.  But now they
cannot, for every thing is expressly
given away to government in this
plan.  Perhaps some people may think
that power which the house of
representatives possesses, of
impeaching the officers of
government, will be a restraint upon
them.  But this entirely vanishes,
when it is considered that the
senate hath the principal say in
appointing these officers, and that
they are the sole judges of all
impeachments.  Now it would be
absurd to suppose that they would
remove their own servants for
performing their secret orders. . .
. For the interest of rulers and the
ruled will then be two distinct
things.  The mode of electing the
president is another excellent
regulation, most wisely calculated
to render him the obsequious machine
of congress.  He is to be chosen by
electors appointed in such manner as
the state legislators shall direct. 
But then the highest in votes cannot
be president, without he has the
majority of all the electors; and if
none have this majority, then the
congress is to choose the president
out of the five highest on the
return.  By this means the congress
will always have the making of the
president after the first election. 
So that if the reigning president
pleases his masters, he need be
under no apprehensions of being
turned out for any severities used
to the people, for though the
congress may not have influence
enough to procure him the majority
of the votes of the electoral
college, yet they will always be
able to prevent any other from
having such a majority; and to have
him returned among the five highest,
so that they may have the appointing
of him themselves. All these wise
regulations, prove to a
demonstration, that the grand
convention was infallible.  The
congress having thus disentangled
themselves from all popular checks
and choices, and being supported by
a well disciplined army and active
militia, will certainly command
dread and respect abroad, obedience
and submission at home.  They will
then look down with awful dignity
and tremendous majesty from the
pinnacle of glory to which fortune
has raised them upon the
insignificant creatures, their
subjects, whom they have reduced to
that state of vassalage and servile
submission, for which they were
primarily destined by nature. 
America will then be great amongst
the nations(3) and princess amongst
the provinces.  Her fleets will
cover the deserts of the ocean and
convert it into a popular city; and
her invincible armies overturn the
thrones of princes.  The glory of
Britain (4) shall fall like
lightning before her puissant arm;
when she ariseth to shake the
nations, and take vengeance on all
who dare oppose her.  O! thou most
venerable and august congress! with
what astonishing ideas my mind is
ravished! when I contemplate thy
rising grandeur, and anticipate thy
future glory!  Happy thy servants!
happy thy vassals! and happy thy
slaves, which fit under the shade of
thy omnipotent authority, and behold
the glory of thy majesty! for such a
state who would not part with ideal
blessings of liberty? who would not
cheerfully resign the nominal
advantages of freedom? the dazzling
splendor of Assyrian, Persian,
Macedonian and Roman greatness will
then be totally eclipsed by the
radiant blaze of this glorious
western luminary!  These beautiful
expressions, aristocracy, and
oligarchy, upon  which the popular
odium hath fixed derision and
contempt, will then resume their
natural emphasis; their genuine
signification will be perfectly
understood, and no more perverted or
abused.
            ARISTOCROTIS

(3) That is, if we may credit the
prognostications with which our
federal news-papers and pamphlets
daily teem.
(4) Britain once the supreme ruler
of this country, but her authority
was rejected.  Not, as a great many
believe, because her claims were
tyrannical and oppressive, but
because her dominion excluded those
from monopolizing the government
into their own hands, whom nature
had qualified to rule.  It is
certainly no more than the natural
right of rulers "to bind their
subjects, in all cases whatsoever."
This power is perfectly synonymous
with that clause in the constitution
which invests congress with power to
make all laws which shall be
"necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers
and all other powers," etc., and
that which says "the constitution,
laws, and treaties of congress shall
be the supreme law of the land; any
thing in the constitutions or laws
of any of the states to the contrary
notwithstanding." But nothing less
would satisfy Britain, than a power
to bind the natural rulers as
well as subjects.

 
                          
Antifederalist No. 52

ON THE GUARANTEE OF CONGRESSIONAL
BIENNIAL ELECTIONS


The following essay was signed by
Consider Arms, Malichi Maynard, and
Samuel Field.  It was taken from The
Hampshire Gazette of April 9, 1788.



     We the subscribers being of the
number, who did not assent to the
ratification of the federal
constitution, under consideration in
the late state convention, held at
Boston, to which we were called by
the suffrages of the corporations
to which we respectively belong-beg
leave, through the channel of your
paper, to lay before the public in
general, and our constituents in
particular, the reasons of our
dissent, and the principles which
governed us in our decision of this
important question.
     Fully convinced, ever since the
late revolution, of the necessity of
a firm, energetic government, we
should have rejoiced in an
opportunity to have given our assent
to such a one; and should in the
present case, most cordially have
done it, could we at the same time
been happy to have seen the
liberties of the people and the
rights of mankind properly guarded
and secured.  We conceive that the
very notion of government carries
along with it the idea of justice
and equity, and that the whole
design of instituting government in
the world, was to preserve men's
properties from rapine, and their
bodies from violence and bloodshed.
     These propositions being
established, we conceive must of
necessity produce the following
consequence: That every constitution
or system, which does not quadrate
with this original design, is not
government, but in fact a subversion
of it.
     Having premised thus much, we
proceed to mention some things in
this constitution to which we
object, and to enter into an
inquiry, whether, and how far they
coincide with those simple and
original notions of government
before mentioned.
     In the first place, as direct
taxes are to be apportioned
according to the numbers in each
state, and as Massachusetts has none
in it but what are declared free
men, so the whole, blacks as well as
whites, must be numbered; this must
therefore operate against us, as
two-fifths of the slaves in the
southern states are to be left out
of the numeration.  Consequently,
three Massachusetts infants will
increase the tax equal to five
sturdy full-grown Negroes of theirs,
who work every day in the week for
their masters, saving the Sabbath,
upon which they are allowed to get
something for their own support.  We
can see no justice in this way of
apportioning taxes.  Neither can we
see any good reason why this was
consented to on the part of our
delegates.
     We suppose it next to
impossible that every individual in
this vast continental union, should
have his wish with regard to every
single article composing a frame of
government.  And therefore, although
we think it More agreeable to the
principles of republicanism, that
elections should be annual, yet as
the elections in our own state
government are so, we did not view
it so dangerous to the liberties of
the people, that we should have
rejected the constitution merely
on account of the biennial elections
of the representatives-had we been
sure that the people have any
security even of this.  But this we
could not find.  For although it is
said, that "the House of
Representatives shall be chosen
every second year, by the people of
the several states," etc., and that
"the times, places and manner of
holding elections for senators and
representatives, shall be prescribed
in each state by the legislature
thereof," yet all this is wholely
superseded by a subsequent
provision, which empowers Congress
at any time to enact a law, whereby
such regulations may be altered,
except as to the places of choosing
senators.  Here we conceive the
people may be very materially
injured, and in time reduced to a
state of as abject vassalage as any
people were under the control of the
most mercenary despot that ever
tarnished the pages of history.  The
depravity of human nature,
illustrated by examples from
history, will warrant us to say, it
may be possible, if not probable,
that the congress may be composed
of men, who will wish to burden and
oppress the people.  In such case,
will not their inventions be
fruitful enough to devise occasions
for postponing the elections?  And
if they can do this once, they can
twice; if they can twice, they
can thrice, so by degrees render
themselves absolute and perpetual. 
Or, if they choose, they have
another expedient.  They can alter
the place of holding elections. 
They can say, whatever the
legislature of this state may order
to the contrary, that all the
elections of our representatives
shall be made at Mechias, or at
Williamstown.  Consequently, nine-
tenths of the people will never
vote.  And if this should be thought
a measure favorable to their
reelection, or the election of some
tool for their mercenary purposes,
we doubt not it will be thus
ordered.  But says the advocates for
the constitution, "it is not likely
this will ever happen; we are not to
expect our rulers will ever proceed
to a wanton exercise of the powers
given them." But what reason have we
more than past ages, to expect that
we shall be blessed with impeccable
rulers?  We think not any.  Although
it has been said that every
generation grows wiser and wiser,
yet we have no reason to think they
grow better and better.  And
therefore the probability lies upon
the dark side.  Does not the
experience of past ages leach, that
men have generally exercised all the
powers they had given them, and even
have usurped upon them, in order to
accomplish their own sinister and
avaricious designs, whenever they
thought they could do it with
impunity?  This we presume will not
be denied.  And it appeared to us
that the arguments made use of by
the favorers of the constitution, in
the late convention at Boston,
proceeded upon the plan of
righteousness in those who are to
rule over us, by virtue of this new
form of government.  But these
arguments, we confess, could have no
weight with us, while we judge them
to be founded altogether upon a
slippery perhaps.
     We are sensible, that in order
to the due administration of
government, it is necessary that
certain powers should be delegated
to the rulers from the people.  At
the same time, we think they ought
carefully to guard against giving
so much as will enable those rulers,
by that means, at once, or even in
process of time, to render
themselves absolute and despotic. 
This we think is the case with the
form of government lately submitted
to our consideration.  We could
not, therefore, acting uprightly,
consulting our own good and the good
of our constituents, give our assent
unto it.  We could not then and we
still cannot see, that because
people are many times guilty of
crimes and deserving of punishment,
that it from thence follows the
authority ought to have power to
punish them when they are not
guilty, or to punish the innocent
with the guilty without
discrimination, which amounts to the
same thing.  But this we think in
fact to be the case as to this
federal constitution.  For the
congress, whether they have
provocation or not, can at any time
order the elections in any or all
the states to be conducted in such
manner as wholely to defeat and
render entirely nugatory the
intention of those elections, and
convert that which was considered
and intended to be the palladium of
the liberties of the people-the
grand bulwark against any invasion
upon them-into a formidable engine,
by which to overthrow them all, and
thus involve them in the depth of
misery and distress.  But it was
pled by some of the ablest advocates
of the constitution, that if
congress should exercise such powers
to the prejudice of the people (and
they did not deny but they could if
they should be disposed) they (the
people) would not suffer it.  They
would have recourse to the ultima
ratio, the dernier resort of the
oppressed-the sword.
     But it appeared to us a piece
of superlative incongruity indeed,
that the people, whilst in the full
and indefeasible possession of their
liberties and privileges, should be
so very profuse, so very liberal in
the disposal of them, as
consequently to place themselves in
a predicament miserable to an
extreme.  So wretched indeed, that
they may at once be reduced to the
sad alternative of yielding
themselves vassals into the hands of
a venal and corrupt administration,
whose only wish may be to aggrandize
themselves and families-to wallow in
luxury and every species of
dissipation, and riot upon the
spoils of the community; or take up
the sword and involve their country
in all the horrors of a civil
war-the consequences of which, we
think, we may venture to augur will
more firmly rivet their shackles and
end in the entailment of vassalage
to their posterity.  We think this
by no means can fall within the
description of government before
mentioned.  Neither can we think
these suggestions merely chimerical,
or that they proceed from an
overheated enthusiasm in favor of
republicanism; neither yet from an
illplaced detestation of
aristocracy; but from the apparent
danger the people are in by
establishing this constitution. 
When we take a forward view of the
proposed congress-seated in the
federal city, ten miles square,
fortified and replenished with all
kinds of military stores and every
implement; with a navy at command on
one side, and a land army on the
other-we say, when we view them thus
possessed of the sword in one hand
and the purse strings of the people
in the other, we can see no security
left for them in the enjoyment of
their liberties, but what may
proceed from the bare possibility
that this supreme authority of the
nation may be possessed of virtue
and integrity sufficient to
influence them in the administration
of equal justice and equity among
those whom they shall govern.  But
why should we voluntarily choose
to trust our all upon so precarious
a tenure as this?  We confess it
gives us pain to anticipate the
future scene: a scene presenting to
view miseries so complicated and
extreme, that it may be part of the
charms of eloquence to extenuate,
or the power of art to remove.
         CONSIDER ARMS
         MALICHI MAYNARD
         SAMUEL FIELD


                          
Antifederalist No. 53

A PLEA FOR THE RIGHT OF RECALL


"AMICUS" appeared in the Columbian
Herald, August 28, 1788.



     Some time before a Convention
of the United States was held, I
mentioned in a paragraph which was
published in one of the Charlestown
papers, that it would be acting
wisely in the formation of a
constitution for a free government,
to enact, that the electors should
recall their representatives when
they thought proper, although they
should be chosen for a certain term
of years; as a right to appoint
(where the right of appointing
originates with the appointees)
implies a right to recall.  As the
persons appointed are meant to act
for the benefit of the appointees,
as well as themselves, they, if they
mean to act for their mutual
benefit, can have no objection to a
proposal of this kind.  But if they
have any sinister designs, they will
certainly oppose it, foreseeing that
their electors will displace them as
soon as they begin to act contrary
to their interest.  I am therefore
glad to find that the state of New
York has proposed an amendment of
this kind to the federal
constitution, viz: That the
legislatures of the respective
states may recall their senators, or
either of them, and elect others in
their stead, to serve the remainder
of the time for which the senators
so recalled were appointed.  I wish
this had been extended to the
representatives in both houses, as
it is as prudent to have a check
over the members of one house as of
the other. 
     Some persons as object to this
amendment, in fact say, that it is
safer to give a man an irrevocable
power of attorney, than a revocable
one; and that it is right to let a
representative ruin us, rather than
recall him and put a real friend of
his country, and a truly honest man
in his place, who would rather
suffer ten thousand deaths than
injure his country, or sully his
honor and reputation.  Such persons
seem to say, that power ought not to
originate with the people (which is
the wish, I fear, of some among us);
and also that we are not safe in
trusting our own legislature with
the power of recalling such senators
as will not abide by such
instructions - as shall be either
given them, when chosen, or sent to
them afterwards, by the legislature
of this or any other state, or by
the electors that chose them,
although they should have met
together in a body for the purpose
of instructing or sending them
instructions on a matter on
which the salvation of the state
depends.  That we should insist on
the amendment respecting this matter
taking place, which the state of New
York has proposed, appears to me to
be absolutely necessary, the
security of each state may be almost
said to rest on it. For my own part,
I would rather that this amendment
should take place and give the new
government unlimited powers to act
for the public good, than give them
limited powers, and at the same time
put it out of our power, for a
certain term of years, to recall our
representatives, although we saw
they were exceeding their powers,
and were bent on making us miserable
and themselves, by means of a
standing army-a perpetual and
absolute government.  For power is a
very intoxicating thing, and has
made many a man do unwarrantable
actions, which before he was
invested with it, he had no thoughts
of doing.  I hope by what I have
said I shall not be thought to cast
even the shadow of a reflection on
the principles of either of the
members of the federal convention-it
is far from being my intention.  I
wish for nothing more than a good
government and a constitution under
which our liberties will be
perfectly safe.  To preserve which,
I think the wisest conduct will be
to keep the staff of power in our
own hands as much as possible, and
not wantonly and inconsiderately
give up a greater share of our
liberties with a view of
contributing to the public good,
than what the necessity of the case
requires.
     For our own sakes we shall keep
in power those persons whose conduct
pleases us as long as we can, and
shall perhaps sometimes wish (when
we meet with a person of an extra
worthy character and abilities) that
we could keep him in power for life. 
On the other hand, we shall dismiss
from our employ as soon as possible,
such persons as do not consult our
interest and will not follow our
instructions.  For there are, I
fear, a few persons among us, so
wise in their own eyes, that they
would if they could, pursue their
own will and inclinations, in
opposition to the instructions
of their constituents.  In so doing,
they may perhaps, once in a hundred
times, act for the interest of those
they represent, more than if they
followed the instructions given
them.  But I wish that we would
never suffer any person to continue
our representative that obeyed not
our instructions, unless something
unforeseen and unknown by us turned
up, which he knew would alter our
sentiments, if we were made
acquainted with it; and which would
make his complying with our will
highly imprudent.  In every
government matter, on which our
representatives were not instructed,
we should leave them to act
agreeable to their own judgment; on
which account we should always
choose men of integrity, honor and
abilities to represent us.  But
when we did instruct them, as they
are our representatives and agents,
we should insist on their acting and
voting conformable to our
directions.  But as they would each
of them be a member of the
community, they should have a
right to deliver to the houses of
representatives of which they were
members, their own private
sentiments so that if their private
sentiments contained cogent reasons
for acting contrary to the
instructions given them-the other
members of said houses who would not
be bound by said instructions, would
be guided by them; in which case,
that would take place which would be
most for the public good, which
ought to be the wish of all of us.
                  AMICUS


                          
Antifederalist No. 54

APPORTIONMENT AND SLAVERY:
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN VIEWS



This four part essay shows both
northern and southern dissatisfaction
with "the Great Compromise"   
    The first is taken from the
third essay of "BRUTUS." 
    The second: from the speeches of
Rawlins Lowndes to the South
Carolina ratifying convention on 
January 16, 17, and 18, 1788.  
    The third: from the sixth essay
by "CATO." 
    The fourth: from an essay by "A
GEORGIAN," appearing in The Gazette
of the State of Georgia on November
15, 1787.


    "Representatives and direct
taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States, which may be
included in this Union, according
to their respective numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the
whole number of free persons,
including those bound to service for
a term of years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three-fifths of
all other persons." What a strange
and unnecessary accumulation of
words are here used to conceal from
the public eye what might have been
expressed in the following concise
manner: Representatives are to be
proportioned among the States
respectively, according to the
number of freemen and slaves
inhabiting them, counting five
slaves for three freemen.
     "In a free State," says the
celebrated Montesquieu, "every man,
who is supposed to be a free agent,
ought to be concerned in his own
government, therefore the
legislature should reside in the
whole body of the people, or their
representatives." But it has never
been alleged that those who are not
free agents can, upon any rational
principle, have anything to do in
government, either by themselves or
others.  If they have no share in
government, why is the number of
members in the assembly to be
increased on their account?  Is it
because in some of the States, a
considerable part of the property
of the inhabitants consists in a
number of their fellow-men, who are
held in bondage, in defiance of
every idea of benevolence, justice
and religion, and contrary to all
the principles of liberty which have
been publicly avowed in the late
Glorious Revolution?  If this be a
just ground for representation, the
horses in some of the States, and
the oxen in others, ought to be
represented-for a great share of
property in some of them consists in
these animals; and they have as much
control over their own actions as
these poor unhappy creatures, who
are intended to be described in
the above recited clause, by the
words, "all other persons." By this
mode of apportionment, the
representatives of the different
parts of the Union will be extremely
unequal; in some of the Southern
States the slaves are nearly equal
in number to the free men; and for
all these slaves they will be
entitled to a proportionate share in
the legislature; this will give them
an unreasonable weight in the
government, which can derive no
additional strength, protection, nor
defense from the slaves, but the
contrary.  Why, then, should they be
represented?  What adds to the evil
is, that these States are to be
permitted to continue the inhuman
traffic of importing slaves until
the year 1808-and for every cargo
of these unhappy people which
unfeeling, unprincipled, barbarous
and avaricious wretches may tear
from their country, friends and
tender connections, and bring into
those States, they are to be
rewarded by having an increase
of members in the General
Assembly....
               BRUTUS

     . . . . six of the Eastern
States formed a majority in the
House of Representatives.  In the
enumeration he passed Rhode Island,
and included Pennsylvania.  Now, was
it consonant with reason, with
wisdom, with policy, to suppose, in
a legislature where a majority
of persons sat whose interests were
greatly different from ours, that we
had the smallest chance of receiving
adequate advantages?  Certainly not. 
He believed the gentlemen that went
from this state, to represent us in
Convention, possessed as much
integrity, and stood as high in
point of character, as any gentlemen
that could have been selected; and
he also believed that they had done
every thing in their power to
procure for us a proportionate share
in this new government; but the very
little they had gained proved what
we may expect in future-that the
interest of the Northern States
would so predominate as to divest us
of any pretensions to the title
of a republic.  In the first place,
what cause was there for jealousy of
our importing Negroes?  Why confine
us to twenty years, or rather why
limit us at all?  For his part, he
thought this trade could be
justified on the principles of
religion, humanity, and justice;
for certainly to translate a set of
human beings from a bad country to a
better, was fulfilling every part of
these principles.  But they
don't like our slaves, because they
have none themselves, and therefore
want to exclude us from this great
advantage.  Why should the Southern
States allow of this, without the
consent of nine states? . . .
     We had a law prohibiting the
importation of Negroes for three
years, a law he greatly approved of;
but there was no reason offered why
the Southern States might not find
it necessary to alter their conduct,
and open their ports. 
     Without Negroes, this state
would degenerate into one of the
most contemptible in the Union; and
he cited an expression that fell
from General Pinckney on a former
debate, that whilst there remained
one acre of swampland in South
Carolina, he should raise his voice
against restricting the importation
of Negroes.  Even in granting the
importation for twenty years, care
had been taken to make us pay for
this indulgence, each negro being
liable, on importation, to pay a
duty not exceeding ten dollars; and,
in addition to this, they were
liable to a capitation tax.  Negroes
were our wealth, our only natural
resource; yet behold how our kind
friends in the north were determined
soon to tie up our hands, and drain
us of what we had!  The Eastern
States drew their means of
subsistence, in a great measure,
from their shipping; and, on that
head, they had been particularly
careful not to allow of any burdens:
they were not to pay tonnage or
duties; no, not even the form of
clearing out:  all ports were free
and open to them!  Why, then, call
this a reciprocal bargain, which
took all from one party, to bestow
it on the other!
     Major [Pierce] BUTLER observed,
that they were to pay five per cent
impost. 
     This, Mr. LOWNDES proved, must
fall upon the consumer.  They are to
be the carriers; and, we being the
consumers, therefore all expenses
would fall upon us.  A great number
of gentlemen were captivated with
this new Constitution, because those
who were in debt would be compelled
to pay; others pleased themselves
with the reflection that no more
confiscation laws would be passed;
but those were small advantages, in
proportion to the evils that might
be apprehended from the laws that
might be passed by Congress,
whenever there was a majority of
representatives from the Eastern
States, who were governed by
prejudices and ideas extremely
different from ours. . . .
     Great stress was laid on the
admirable checks which guarded us,
under the new Constitution, from the
encroachments of tyranny; but too
many checks in a political machine
must produce the same mischief as in
a mechanical one-that of throwing
all into confusion.  But supposing
we considered ourselves so much
aggrieved as to reduce us to the
necessity of insisting on redress,
what probability had we of relief? 
Very little indeed.  In the
revolving on misfortune, some little
gleams of comfort resulted from a
hope of being able to resort to an
impartial tribunal for redress; but
pray what reason was there for
expectancy that, in Congress, the
interest of five Southern States
would be considered in a preferable
point of view to the nine Eastern
ones?
     .... the mode of legislation in
the infancy of free communities was
by the collective body, and this
consisted of free persons, or those
whose age admitted them to the right
of mankind and citizenship, whose
sex made them capable of protecting
the state, and whose birth may be
denominated Free Born; and no traces
can be found that ever women,
children, and slaves, or those who
were not sui juris, in the early
days of legislation, met with the
free members of the community to
deliberate on public measures; hence
is derived this maxim in free
governments, that representation
ought to bear a proportion to the
number of free inhabitants in a
community; this principle your own
state constitution, and others, have
observed in the establishment of a
future census, in order to apportion
the representatives, and to increase
or diminish the representation to
the ratio of the increase or
diminution of electors.  But, what
aid can the community derive from
the assistance women, infants and
slaves, in their deliberation, or in
their defense?  What motives,
therefore, could the convention have
in departing from just and rational
principle of representation, which
is the governing prince of this state
and of all America?
                      CATO


     Article 1, section 2. This
section mentions that, within three
years after the first meeting of the
Congress of the United States, an
enumeration shall take place, the
number of representatives not to
exceed one member for every 30,000. 
This article I believe to be
inadmissable.  First, it affords to
small a representation, (supposing
48 at the highest calculation) and
especially in the southern states,
their climate, soil, and produce, .
. . not being capable of that
population as in the northern
states.  Would it not therefore be
better to increase the number of
representatives, say one member for
every 20,000 for the states north of
Virginia, and one for every 15,000
south of the said state, itself
included?  Or, secondly, divide the
states into districts which shall
choose the representatives, by
which every part of a state will
have an equal chance, without being
liable to parties or factions? 
Should it be said it will increase
the expense, it will be money well
laid out, and the more so if we
retain the paying them out of our
own bands.  And, supposing the
voting in the house of
representatives was continued as
heretofore by states, would it not
be more equal still?  At any rate I
would strenuously recommend to vote
by states, and not individually, as
it will be accommodating the idea of
equality, which should ever be
observed in a republican form of
government.  Or, thirdly, if it was
in proportion to the quotas of the
states, as rated in taxation, then
the number of members would increase
with the proportion of tax, and at
that rate there would always be an
equality in the quota of tax as well
as representation; for what chance
of equality according to the
constitution in question, can a
state have that has only one or two
votes, when others have eight or
ten, (for it is evident that each
representative, as well as senator,
is meant to have a vote, as it
mentions no other mode but in
choosing the president), and as it
is generally allowed that the United
States are divided into two natural
divisions, the northern as far as
Virginia, the latter included forms
the southern?  This produces a wide
difference in climate, soil,
customs, manners of living, and the
produce of the land, as well as
trade, also in population, to which
it is well observed the latter is
not so favorable as the former, and
never can nor will be, nature itself
being the great obstacle.  And when
taxation is in agitation, as also
many other points, it must produce
differences in sentiments; and, in
such dispute, how is it likely to be
decided?  According to the mode of
voting, the number of members north
of Virginia the first three years is
42, and the southern, Virginia
included, 23....
     Is human nature above self
interest?  If the northern states do
not horde the southern in taxation,
it would appear then really that
they are more disinterested men than
we know of.


 
Antifederalist No. 55

WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE
GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE?  (PART 1)



Following are four essays by "THE
FEDERAL FARMER" 


     .... It being impracticable for
the people to assemble to make laws,
they must elect legislators, and
assign men to the different
departments of the government.  In
the representative branch we must
expect chiefly to collect the
confidence of the people, and in it
to find almost entirely the force of
persuasion.  In forming this branch,
therefore, several important
considerations must be attended to. 
It must possess abilities to discern
the situation of the people and of
public affairs, a disposition to
sympathize with the people, and a
capacity and inclination to make
laws congenial to their
circumstances and condition.  It
must afford security against
interest combinations, corruption
and influence.  It must possess the
confidence, and have the voluntary
support of the people.
     I think these positions will
not be controverted, nor the one I
formerly advanced, that a fair and
equal representation is that in
which the interests, feelings,
opinions and views of the people are
collected, in such manner as they
would be were the people all
assembled.  Having made these
general observations, I shall
proceed to consider further my
principal position, viz. that there
is no substantial representation of
the people provided for in a
government, in which the most
essential powers, even as to the
internal police of the country, are
proposed to be lodged; and to
propose certain amendments as to the
representative branch....
     The representation is
insubstantial and ought to be
increased.  In matters where there
is much room for opinion, you
will not expect me to establish my
positions with mathematical
certainty; you must only expect my
observations to be candid, and such
as are well founded in the mind of
the writer.  I am in a field where
doctors disagree; and as to genuine
representation, though no feature in
government can be more important,
perhaps, no one has been less
understood, and no one that has
received so imperfect a
consideration by political writers. 
The ephori in Sparta, and the
tribunes in Rome, were but the
shadow; the representation in Great
Britain is unequal and insecure.  In
America we have done more in 
establishing this important branch
on its true principles, than,
perhaps, all the world besides.  Yet
even here, I conceive, that very
great improvements in representation
may be made.  In fixing this branch,
the situation of the people must be
surveyed, and the number of
representatives and forms of
election apportioned to that
situation.  When we find a numerous
people settled in a fertile and
extensive country, possessing
equality, and few or none of them
oppressed with riches or wants, it
ought to be the anxious care of the
constitution and laws, to arrest
them from national depravity, and to
preserve them in their happy
condition.  A virtuous people make
just laws, and good laws tend to
preserve unchanged a virtuous
people.  A virtuous and happy people
by laws uncongenial to their
characters, may easily be gradually
changed into servile and depraved
creatures.  Where the people, or
their representatives, make the
laws, it is probable they will
generally be fitted to the national
character and circumstances, unless
the representation be partial, and
the imperfect substitute of the
people.  However the people may be
electors, if the representation be
so formed as to give one or more of
the natural classes of men in
society an undue ascendancy over
others, it is imperfect; the former
will gradually become masters, and
the latter slaves.  It is the first
of all among the political balances,
to preserve in its proper station
each of these classes.  We talk of
balances in the legislature, and
among the departments of government;
we ought to carry them to the body
of the people.  Since I advanced the
idea of balancing the several orders
of men in a community, in forming a
genuine representation, and seen
that idea considered as chimerical,
I have been sensibly struck with a
sentence in the Marquis Beccaria's
treatise.  This sentence was quoted
by Congress in 1774, and is as
follows:-"In every society there
is an effort continually tending to
confer on one part the height of
power and happiness, and to reduce
the others to the extreme of
weakness and misery; the intent of
good laws is to oppose this effort,
and to diffuse their influence
universally and equally." Add to
this Montesquieu's opinion, that "in
a free state every man, who is
supposed to be a free agent, ought
to be concerned in his own
government: therefore, the
legislative should reside in the
whole body of the people, or their
representatives." It is extremely
clear that these writers had in view
the several orders of men in
society, which we call
aristocratical, democratical,
mercantile, mechanics etc., and
perceived the efforts they are
constantly, from interested and
ambitious views, disposed to make to
elevate themselves and oppress
others.  Each order must have a
share in the business of legislation
actually and efficiently.  It is
deceiving a people to tell them they
are electors, and can choose their
legislators, if they cannot, in the
nature of things, choose men from
among themselves, and genuinely like
themselves.  I wish you to take
another idea along with you.  We are
not only to balance these natural
efforts, but we are also to guard
against accidental combinations;
combinations founded in the
connections of offices and private
interests, both evils which are
increased in proportion as the
number of men, among which the
elected must be, are decreased.  To
set this matter in a proper point of
view, we must form some general
ideas and descriptions of the
different classes of men, as they
may be divided by occupation and
politically.  The first class is the
aristocratical.  There are three
kinds of aristocracy spoken of in
this country-the first is a
constitutional one, which does not
exist in the United States in our
common acceptation of the word. 
Montesquieu, it is true, observes
that where part of the persons in a
society, for want of property, age,
or moral character, are excluded any
share in the government, the others,
who alone are the constitutional
electors and elected, form this
aristocracy.  This, according to
him, exists in each of the United
States, where a considerable number
of persons, as all convicted of
crimes, under age, or not possessed
of certain property, are excluded
any share in the government.  The
second is an aristocratic faction, a
junto of unprincipled men, often
distinguished for their wealth or
abilities, who combine together and
make their object their private
interests and aggrandizement.  The
existence of this description is
merely accidental, but particularly
to be guarded against.  The third is
the natural aristocracy; this term
we use to designate a respectable
order of men, the line between whom
and the natural democracy is in some
degree arbitrary.  We may place men
on one side of this line, which
others may place on the other, and
in all disputes between the few and
the many, a considerable number are
wavering and uncertain themselves on
which side they are, or ought to be. 
In my idea of our natural
aristocracy in the United States, I
include about four or five thousand
men; and among these I reckon those
who have been placed in the offices
of governors, of members of
Congress, and state senators
generally, in the principal officers
of the army and militia, the
superior judges, the most eminent
professional men, etc., and men of
large property.  The other persons
and orders in the community form the
natural democracy; this includes in
general, the yeomanry, the
subordinate officers, civil and
military, the fishermen, mechanics
and traders, many of the merchants
and professional men.  It is easy to
perceive that men of these two
classes, the aristocratical and
democratical, with views equally
honest, have sentiments widely
different, especially respecting
public and private expenses,
salaries, taxes, etc.  Men of the
first class associate more
extensively, have a high sense of
honor, possess abilities, ambition,
and general knowledge; men of the
second class are not so much used to
combining great objects; they
possess less ambition, and a larger
share of honesty; their dependence
is principally on middling and small
estates, industrious pursuits, and
hard labor, while that of the former
is principally on the emoluments of
large estates, and of the chief
offices of government.  Not only the
efforts of these two great parties
are to be balanced, but other
interests and parties also, which do
not always oppress each other merely
for want of power, and for fear of
the consequences; though they, in
fact, mutually depend on each other. 
Yet such are their general views,
that the merchants alone would never
fail to make laws favorable to
themselves and oppressive to the
farmers.  The farmers alone would
act on like principles; the former
would tax the land, the latter the
trade.  The manufacturers are often
disposed to contend for monopolies;
buyers make every exertion to lower
prices; and sellers to raise them. 
Men who live by fees and salaries
endeavor to raise them; and the part
of the people who pay them, endeavor
to lower them; the public creditors
to augment the taxes, and the people
at large to lessen them.  Thus, in
every period of society, and in all
the transactions of men, we see
parties verifying the observation
made by the Marquis; and those
classes which have not their
centinels in the government, in
proportion to what they have to gain
or lose, must infallibly be ruined.
     Efforts among parties are not
merely confined to property.  They
contend for rank and distinctions;
all their passions in turn are
enlisted in political controversies. 
Men, elevated in society, are often
disgusted with the changeableness
of the democracy, and the latter are
often agitated with the passions of
jealousy and envy.  The yeomanry
possess a large share of property
and strength, are nervous and firm
in their opinions and habits; the
mechanics of towns are ardent and
changeable-honest and credulous,
they are inconsiderable for numbers,
weight and strength, not always
sufficiently stable for supporting
free governments; the fishing
interest partakes partly of the
strength and stability of the
landed, and partly of the
changeableness of the mechanic
interest.  As to merchants and
traders, they are our agents in
almost all money transactions, give
activity to government, and possess
a considerable share of influence
in it.  It has been observed by an
able writer, that frugal industrious
merchants are generally advocates
for liberty.  It is an observation,
I believe, well founded, that the
schools produce but few advocates
for republican forms of government. 
Gentlemen of the law, divinity,
physic, etc., probably form about a
fourth part of the people; yet their
political influence, perhaps, is
equal to that of all the other
descriptions of men.  If we may
judge from the appointments to
Congress, the legal characters will
often, in a small representation, be
the majority; but the more the
representatives are increased, the
more of the farmers, merchants,
etc., will be found to be brought
into the government.
     These general observations will
enable you to discern what I intend
by different classes, and the
general scope of my ideas, when I
contend for uniting and balancing
their interests, feelings, opinions,
and views in the legislature.  We
may not only so unite and balance
these as to prevent a change in the
government by the gradual exaltation
of one part to the depression of
others, but we may derive many other
advantages from the combination and
full representation.  A small
representation can never be well
informed as to the circumstances of
the people.  The members of it must
be too far removed from the people,
in general, to sympathize with them,
and too few to communicate with
them.  A representation must be
extremely imperfect where the
representatives are not
circumstanced to make the proper
communications to their
constituents, and where the
constituents in turn cannot, with
tolerable convenience, make known
their wants, circumstances, and
opinions to their representatives. 
Where there is but one
representative to 30,000 or 40,000
inhabitants, it appears to me, he
can only mix and be acquainted with
a few respectable characters among
his constituents.  Even double the
general representation, and then
there must be a very great distance
between the representatives and the
people in general represented.  On
the proposed plan, the state of
Delaware, the city of Philadelphia,
the state of Rhode Island, the
province of Maine, the county of
Suffolk in Massachusetts, will have
one representative each.  There can
be but little personal knowledge, or
but few communications, between him
and the people at large of either of
those districts.  It has been
observed that mixing only with the
respectable men, he will get the
best information and ideas from
them; he will also receive
impressions favorable to their
purposes particularly....
      Could we get over all our
difficulties respecting a balance of
interests and party efforts, to
raise some and oppress others, the
want of sympathy, information and
intercourse between the
representatives and the people, an
insuperable difficulty will still
remain.  I mean the constant
liability of a small number of
representatives to private
combinations.  The tyranny of the
one, or the licentiousness of the
multitude, are, in my mind, but
small evils, compared with the
factions of the few.  It is a
consideration well worth pursuing,
how far this house of
representatives will be liable to be
formed into private juntos, how far
influenced by expectations of
appointments and offices, how far
liable to be managed by the
president and senate, and how far
the people will have confidence in
them....
         THE FEDERAL FARMER



Antifederalist No. 56

WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE
GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE?  (PART 2)



     . . . . Why in England have the
revolutions always ended in
stipulations in favor of general
liberty, equal laws, and the common
rights of the people, and in most
other countries in favor only of a
few influential men?  The reasons,
in my mind, are obvious.  In England
the people have been substantially
represented in many respects; in the
other countries it has not been so. 
Perhaps a small degree of attention
to a few simple facts will
illustrate this.  In England, from
the oppressions of the Norman Kings
to the revolution in 1688, during
which period of two or three hundred
years, the English liberties were
ascertained and established, the
aristocratic part of that nation was
substantially represented by a very
large number of nobles, possessing
similar interests and feelings with
those they represented.  The body of
the people, about four or five
millions, then mostly a frugal
landed people, were represented by
about five hundred representatives,
taken not from the order of men
which formed the aristocracy, but
from the body of the people, and
possessed of the same interests and
feelings.  De Lolme, speaking of the
British representation, expressly
founds all his reasons on this
union; this similitude of interests,
feelings, views and circumstances. 
He observes the English have
preserved their liberties, because
they and their leaders or
representatives have been strictly
united in interests, and in
contending for general liberty. 
Here we see a genuine balance
founded in the actual state of
things.  The whole community,
probably, not more than two-fifths
more numerous than we now are, were
represented by seven or eight
hundred men; the barons stipulated
with the common people, and the king
with the whole.  Had the legal
distinction between lords and
commons been broken down, and the
people of that island been called
upon to elect forty-five senators,
and one hundred and twenty
representatives, about the
proportion we propose to establish,
their whole legislature evidently
would have been of the natural
aristocracy, and the body of the
people would not have had scarcely a
single sincere advocate.  Their
interests would have been neglected,
general and equal liberty forgot,
and the balance lost.  Contests and
conciliations, as in most other
countries, would have been merely
among the few, and as it might have
been necessary to serve their
purposes, the people at large
would have been flattered or
threatened, and probably not a
single stipulation made in their
favor.  In Rome the people were
miserable, though they bad three
orders, the consuls, senators, and
tribunes, and approved the laws, and
all for want of a genuine
representation.  The people were too
numerous to assemble, and do any
thing properly themselves.  The
voice of a few, the dupes of
artifice, was called the voice of
the people.  It is difficult for the
people to defend themselves against
the arts and intrigues of the great,
but by selecting a suitable number
of men fixed to their interests to
represent them, and to oppose
ministers and senators. . . . [Much]
depends on the number of the men
selected, and the manner of doing
it.  To be convinced of this, we
need only attend to the reason of
the case, the conduct of the British
commons, and of the Roman tribunes. 
Equal liberty prevails in England,
because there was a representation
of the people, in fact and reality,
to establish it.  Equal liberty
never prevailed in Rome because
there was but the shadow of a
representation.  There were consuls
in Rome annually elected to execute
the laws; several hundred senators
represented the great families; the
body of the people annually chose
tribunes from among themselves to
defend them and to secure their
rights; I think the number of
tribunes annually chosen never
exceeded ten.  This representation,
perhaps, was not proportionally so
numerous as the representation
proposed in the new plan; but the
difference will not appear to be so
great, when it shall be recollected,
that these tribunes were chosen
annually, that the great patrician
families were not admitted to these
offices of tribunes, and that the
people of Italy who elected the
tribunes were a long while, if not
always, a small people compared with
the people of the United States. 
What was the consequence of this
trifling representation?  The people
of Rome always elected for their
tribunes men conspicuous for their
riches, military commands,
professional popularity, etc., great
commoners, between whom and the
noble families there was only the
shadowy difference of legal
distinction.  Among all the tribunes
the people chose for several
centuries, they had scarcely five
real friends to their interests. 
These tribunes lived, felt and
saw, not like the people, but like
the great patrician families, like
senators and great officers of
state, to get into which it was
evident by their conduct, was their
sole object.  These tribunes often
talked about the rights and
prerogatives of the people, and that
was all; for they never even
attempted to establish equal
liberty.  So far from establishing
the rights of the people, they
suffered the senate, to the
exclusion of the people, to engross
the powers of taxation; those
excellent and almost only real
weapons of defense even the people
of England possess.  The tribunes
obtained that the people should be
eligible to some of the great
offices of state, and marry, if they
pleased, into the noble families;
these were advantages in their
nature, confined to a few elevated
commoners, and of trifling
importance to the people at large. 
Nearly the same observations may be
made as to the ephori of Sparta.
     We may amuse ourselves with
names; but the fact is, men will be
governed by the motives and
temptations that surround their
situation.  Political evils to be
guarded against are in the human
character, and not in the name of
patrician or plebeian.  Had the
people of Italy, in the early period
of the republic, selected yearly or
biennially, four or five hundred of
their best informed men,
emphatically from among themselves,
these representatives would have
formed an honest respectable
assembly, capable of combining in
them the views and exertions of the
people and their respectability
would have procured them honest and
able leaders, and we should have
seen equal liberty established. 
True liberty stands in need of a
fostering band,- from the days of
Adam she has found but one temple to
dwell in securely.  She has laid the
foundation of one, perhaps her last
in America; whether this is to be
completed and have duration, is yet
a question.  Equal liberty never yet
found many advocates among the
great.  It is a disagreeable truth
that power perverts men's views in a
greater degree than public
employments inform their
understandings.  They become
hardened in certain maxims, and more
lost to fellow feelings.  Men may
always be too cautious to commit
alarming and glaring iniquities; but
they, as well as systems, are liable
to be corrupted by slow degrees. 
Junius well observes, we are not
only to guard against what men will
do, but even against what they may
do.  Men in high public offices are
in stations where they gradually
lose sight of the people, and do not
often think of attending to them,
except when necessary to answer
private purposes.
     The body of the people must
have this true representative
security placed some where in the
nation.  And in the United States,
or in any extended empire, I am
fully persuaded [it] can be placed
no where, but in the forms of a
federal republic, where we can
divide and place it in several state
or district legislatures, giving the
people in these the means of
opposing heavy internal taxes and
oppressive measures in the proper
stages.  A great empire contains the
amities and animosities of a world
within itself.  We are not like the
people of England, one people
compactly settled on a small island,
with a great city filled with frugal
merchants, serving as a common
centre of liberty and union.  We are
dispersed, and it is impracticable
for any but the few to assemble in
one place.  The few must be watched,
checked, and often resisted. 
Tyranny has ever shown a
predilection to be in close amity
with them, or the one man.  Drive it
from kings and it flies to senators,
to decemviri, to dictators, to
tribunes, to popular leaders, to
military chiefs, etc.
      De Lolme well observes, that
in societies, laws which were to be
equal to all are soon warped to the
private interests of the
administrators, and made to defend
the usurpations of a few.  The
English, who had tasted the sweets
of equal laws, were aware of this,
and though they restored their king,
they carefully delegated to
parliament the advocates of freedom.
     I have often lately heard it
observed that it will do very well
for a people to make a constitution
and ordain that at stated periods
they will choose, in a certain
manner, a first magistrate, a given
number of senators and
representatives, and let them have
all power to do as they please. 
This doctrine, however it may do for
a small republic-as Connecticut, for
instance, where the people may
choose so many senators and
representatives to assemble in the
legislature, [representing] in an
eminent degree, the interests, the
views, feelings, and genuine
sentiments of the people themselves
- can never be admitted in an
extensive country.  And when this
power is lodged in the hands of a
few, not to limit the few is but one
step short of giving absolute power
to one man.  In a numerous
representation the abuse of power is
a common injury, and has no
temptation; among the few, the abuse
of power may often operate to the
private emolument of those who abuse
it.
         THE FEDERAL FARMER



                          
Antifederalist No. 57

WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE
GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 3)




     . . . . But "the people
must elect good men." Examine the
system-is it practicable for them to
elect fit and proper representatives
where the number is so small?  "But
the people may choose whom they
please." This is an observation, I
believe, made without due attention
to facts and the state of the
community, To explain my meaning,
I will consider the descriptions of
men commonly presented to the people
as candidates for the offices of
representatives.  We may rank them
in three classes.
    1. The men who form the natural
aristocracy, as before defined.
    2. Popular demagogues-these men
also are often politically elevated,
so as to be seen by the people
through the extent of large
districts; they often have some
abilities, fare] without principle,
and rise into notice by their noise
and arts.
    3.  The substantial and
respectable part of the democracy-
they are a numerous and valuable set
of men, who discern and judge well,
but from being generally silent in
public assemblies are often
overlooked.  They are the most
substantial and best informed men in
the several towns, who occasionally
fill the middle grades of offices,
etc., who hold not a splendid, but
respectable rank in private
concerns.  These men are extensively
diffused through all the counties,
towns and small districts in the
union; even they, and their
immediate connections, are raised
above the majority of the people,
and as representatives are only
brought to a level with a more
numerous part of the community, the
middle orders, and a degree nearer
the mass of the people.  Hence it
is, that the best practical
representation, even in a small
state, must be several degrees more
aristocratical than the body of the
people.  A representation so formed
as to admit but few or none of the
third class, is in my opinion, not
deserving of the name. Even in
armies, courts-martial are so formed
as to admit subaltern officers into
them.  The true idea is, so to open
and enlarge the representation as to
let in a due proportion of the third
class with those of the first.  Now,
my opinion is, that the
representation proposed is so small
as that ordinarily very few or none
of them can be elected.  And,
therefore, after all the parade of
words and forms, the government must
possess the soul of aristocracy, or
something worse, the spirit of
popular leaders.
     I observed in a former letter,
that the state of Delaware, of Rhode
Island, the Province of Maine, and
each of the great counties in
Massachusetts, etc., would have one
member, and rather more than one
when the representatives shall be
increased to one for each 30,000
inhabitants.  In some districts the
people are more dispersed and
unequal than in others.  In Delaware
they are compact, in the Province of
Maine dispersed; how can the
elections in either of those
districts be regulated so that a man
of the third class can be elected? 
Exactly the same principles and
motives, the same uncontrollable
circumstances, must govern the
elections as in the choice of the
governors.  Call upon the people of
either of those districts to choose
a governor, and it will probably
never happen that they will not
bestow a major part, or the greatest
number, of their votes on some very
conspicuous or very popular
character.  A man that is known
among a few thousands of people, may
be quite unknown among thirty or
forty thousand.  On the whole it
appears to me to be almost a self-
evident position, that when we call
on thirty or forty thousand
inhabitants to unite in giving their
votes for one man it will be
uniformly impracticable for them to
unite in any men, except those few
who have become eminent for their
civil or military rank, or their
popular legal abilities.  It will be
found totally impracticable for men
in the private walks of life, except
in the profession of the law, to
become conspicuous enough to attract
the notice of so many electors and
have their suffrages.
     But if I am right, it is asked
why so many respectable men advocate
the adoption of the proposed system. 
Several reasons may be given.  Many
of our gentlemen are attached to the
principles of monarchy and
aristocracy; they have an aversion
to democratic republics.  The body
of the people have acquired large
powers and substantial influence
by the revolution.  In the unsettled
state of things, their numerous
representatives, in some instances,
misused their powers, and have
induced many good men suddenly to
adopt ideas unfavorable to such
republics, and which ideas they will
discard on reflection.  Without
scrutinizing into the particulars of
the proposed system, we immediately
perceive that its general tendency
is to collect the powers of
government, now in the body of the
people in reality, and to place them
in the higher orders and fewer
hands; no wonder then that all those
of and about these orders are
attached to it.  They feel there is
something in this system
advantageous to them.  On the other
hand, the body of the people
evidently feel there is something
wrong and disadvantageous to them. 
Both descriptions perceive there is
something tending to bestow on the
former the height of power and
happiness, and to reduce the latter
to weakness, insignificance, and
misery.  The people evidently feel
all this though they want
expressions to convey their ideas. 
Further, even the respectable part
of the democracy have never yet been
able to distinguish clearly where
the fallacy lies.  They find there
are defects in the confederation;
they see a system presented; they
think something must be done; and,
while their minds are in suspense,
the zealous advocates force a
reluctant consent.  Nothing can be a
stronger evidence of the nature of
this system, than the general sense
of the several orders in the
community respecting its tendency. 
The parts taken generally by them
proves my position, that
notwithstanding the parade of words
and forms, the government must
possess the soul of aristocracy.
     Congress, heretofore, have
asked for moderate additional
powers.  The cry was give them-be
federal.  But the proper distinction
between the cases that produce this
disposition, and the system
proposed, has not been fairly made

and seen in all its consequences. 
We have seen some of our state
representations too numerous and
without examining a medium we run to
the opposite extreme.  It is true,
the proper number of federal
representatives, is matter of
opinion in some degree; but there
are extremes which we immediately
perceive, and others which we
clearly discover on examination.  We
should readily pronounce a
representative branch of 15 members
small in a federal government,
having complete powers as to taxes,
military matters, commerce, the
coin, etc.  On the other hand, we
should readily pronounce a federal
representation as numerous as those
of the several states, consisting of
about 1,500 representatives,
unwieldy and totally improper.  It
is asked, has not the wisdom of the
convention found the medium? 
Perhaps not.  The convention was
divided on this point of numbers. 
At least some of its ablest members
urged, that instead of 65
representatives there ought to be
130 in the first instance.  They
fixed one representative for each
40,000 inhabitants, and at the close
of the work, the president suggested
that the representation appeared to
be too small and without debate, it
was put at, not exceeding one for
each 30,000. I mention these facts
to show, that the convention went on
no fixed data.  In this extensive
country it is difficult to get a
representation sufficiently
numerous.  Necessity, I believe,
will oblige us to sacrifice in some
degree the true genuine principles
of representation.   But this
sacrifice ought to be as little as
possible.  How far we ought to
increase the representation I will
not pretend to say; but that we
ought to increase it very
considerably, is clear-to double it
at least, making full allowances for
the state representations.  And this
we may evidently do and approach
accordingly towards safety and
perfection without encountering any
inconveniences.  It is with great
difficulty the people can unite
these different interests and views
even tolerably, in the state
senators, who are more than twice as
numerous as the federal
representatives, as proposed by the
convention; even these senators are
considered as so far removed from
the people, that they are not
allowed immediately to hold their
purse strings. The principal
objections made to the increase of
the representation are, the expense
and difficulty in getting the
members to attend.  The first cannot
be important; the last, if founded,
is against any federal government. 
As to the expense, I presume the
house of representatives will not be
in sessions more than four months in
the year.  We find by experience
that about two-thirds of the members
of representative assemblies usually
attend; therefore, of the
representation proposed by the
convention, about forty-five members
probably will attend.  Doubling
their number, about 90 will probably
attend.  Their pay, in one case, at
four dollars a day each (which is
putting it high enough) will amount
to, yearly, 21,600 dollars; in the
other case, 43,200 dollars-[a]
difference [of] 21,600 dollars. 
Reduce the state representatives
from 1,500 down to 1,000 and thereby
save the attendance of two-thirds of
the 500, say three months in a year,
at one dollar and a quarter a day
each [would amount to] 37,125
dollars.  Thus we may leave the
state representations sufficient
large, and yet save enough by the
reduction nearly to support
exceeding well the whole federal
representation I propose.  Surely we
-never can be so unwise as to
sacrifice, essentially, the all-
important principles of
representation for so small a sum as
21,600 dollars a year for the United
States.  A single company of
soldiers would cost this sum.  It is
a fact that can easily be shown,
that we expend three times this sum
every year upon useless inferior
offices and very trifling concerns. 
It is also a fact which can be shown
that the United States in the late
war suffered more by a faction in
the federal government, then the pay
of the federal representation will
amount to for twenty years.
     As to the attendance-can we
be so unwise as to establish an
unsafe and inadequate representative
branch, and give it as a reason,
that we believe only a few members
will be induced to attend?  We ought
certainly to establish an adequate
representative branch, and adopt
measures to induce an attendance.  I
believe that a due proportion of 130
or 140 members may be induced to
attend.  There are various reasons
for the non-attendance of the
members of the present congress; it
is to be presumed that these will
not exist under the new system... I
     In the second place, it is said
the members of congress must return
home, and share in the burdens they
may impose; and, therefore, private
motives will induce them to make
mild laws, to support liberty, and
ease the burdens of the people, This
brings us to a mere question of
interest under this head.  I think
these observations will appear, on
examination, altogether fallacious;
because this individual interest,
which may coincide with the rights
and interests of the people, will be
far more than balanced by opposite
motives and opposite interests.  If,
on a fair calculation, a man will
gain more by measures oppressive to
others than he will lose by them, he
is interested in their adoption.  It
is true, that those who govern
generally, by increasing the public
burdens, increase their own share of
them; but by this increase they may,
and often do, increase their
salaries, fees, and emoluments, in a
tenfold proportion, by increasing
salaries, forming armies and navies,
and by making offices.  If it shall
appear the members of congress will
have these temptations before them,
the argument is on my side.  They
will view the account, and be
induced continually to make efforts
advantageous to themselves and
connections, and oppressive to
others.
     We must examine facts.
Congress, in its present form, have
but few offices to dispose of worth
the attention of the members, or of
men of the aristocracy.  Yet from
1774 to this time, we find a large
proportion of those offices assigned
to those who were or had been
members of congress; and though the
states choose annually sixty or
seventy members, many of them have
been provided for.  But few men are
known to congress in this extensive
country, and, probably, but few will
be to the president and senate,
except those who have or shall
appear as members of congress, or
those whom the members may bring
forward.  The states may now choose
yearly ninety-one members of
congress; under the new constitution
they will have it in their power to
choose exactly the same number,
perhaps afterwards, one hundred and
:fifteen, but these must be chosen
once in two and six years.  So that,
in the course of ten years together,
not more than two-thirds so many
members of congress will be elected
and brought into view, as there now
are under the confederation in the
same term of time.  But at least
there will be five, if not ten
times, as many offices and places
worthy of the attention of the
members, under the new constitution,
as there are under the
confederation.  Therefore, we may
fairly presume, that a very great
proportion of the members of
congress, especially the influential
ones, instead of returning to
private life, will be provided for
with lucrative offices, in the civil
or military department; and not only
the members, but many of their sons,
friends, and connections.  These
offices will be in the
constitutional disposition of the
president and senate, and,
corruption out of the question, what
kind of security can we expect in a
representation so many of the
members of which may rationally feel
themselves candidates for these
offices?  Let common sense decide. 
It is true, that members chosen to
offices must leave their seats in
congress; and to some few offices
they cannot be elected till the time
shall be expired for which they were
elected members.  But this scarcely
will effect the bias arising from
the hopes and expectations of
office....
     But it is asked how shall we
remedy the evil, so as to complete
and perpetuate the temple of equal
laws and equal liberty?  Perhaps
we never can do it.  Possibly we
never may be able to do it in this
immense country, under any one
system of laws however modified. 
Nevertheless, at present, I think
the experiment worth making.  I feel
an aversion to the disunion of the
states, and to separate
confederacies; the states have
fought and bled in a common cause,
and great dangers too may attend
these confederacies.  I think the
system proposed capable of very
considerable degrees of perfection,
if we pursue first principles.  I do
not think that De Lolme, or any
writer I have seen, has sufficiently
pursued the proper inquiries and
efficient means for making
representation and balances in
government more perfect.  It is our
task to do this in America.  Our
object is equal liberty, and equal
laws diffusing their influence among
all orders of men.  To obtain this
we must guard against the bias of
interest and passions, against
interested combinations, secret or
open.  We must aim at a balance of
efforts and strength.
     Clear it is, by increasing
the representation we lessen the
prospects of each member of congress
being provided for in public
offices.  We proportionably lessen
official influence, and strengthen
his prospects of becoming a private
citizen, subject to the common
burdens, without the compensation of
the emoluments of office.  By
increasing the representation we
make it more difficult to corrupt
and influence the members.  We
diffuse them more extensively among
the body of the people, perfect the
balance, multiply information,
strengthen the confidence of the
people, and consequently support the
laws on equal and free principles. 
There are two other ways, I think,
of obtaining in some degree the
security we want; the one is, by
excluding more extensively the
members from being appointed to
offices; the other is, by limiting
some of their powers.  These two I
shall examine hereafter.
         THE FEDERAL FARMER



Antifederalist No. 58

WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE
GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 4)



     It is said that our people have
a high sense of freedom, possess
power, property, and the strong arm;
meaning, I presume, that the body of
the people can take care of
themselves, and awe their rulers;
and, therefore, particular provision
in the constitution for their
security may not be essential.  When
I come to examine these
observations, they appear to me too
trifling and loose to deserve a
serious answer.
     To palliate for the smallness
of the representation, it is
observed, that the state governments
in which the people are fully
represented, necessarily form a part
of the system.  This idea ought to
be fully examined.  We ought to
inquire if the convention have
made the proper use of these
essential parts.  The state
governments then, we are told, will
stand between the arbitrary exercise
of power and the people.  True they
may, but armless and helpless,
perhaps, with the privilege of
making a noise when hurt.  This is
no more than individuals may do. 
Does the constitution provide a
single check for a single measure by
which the state governments can
constitutionally and regularly
check the arbitrary measures of
congress?  Congress may raise
immediately fifty thousand men
and twenty millions of dollars in
taxes, build a navy, model the
militia, etc., and all this 
constitutionally.  Congress may arm
on every point, and the state
governments can do no more than an
individual, by petition to congress,
suggest their measures are alarming
and not right.
     I conceive the position to be
undeniable, that the federal
government will be principally in
the hands of the natural
aristocracy, and the state
governments principally in the hands
of the democracy, the
representatives of the body of the
people.  These representatives in
Great Britain hold the purse, and
have a negative upon all laws.  We
must yield to circumstances and
depart something from this plan, and
strike out a new medium so as to
give efficacy to the whole system,
supply the wants of the union, and
leave the several states, or the
people assembled in the state
legislatures, the means of defense.
     It has been often mentioned
that the objects of congress will be
few and national, and require a
small representation; that the
objects of each state will be many
and local, and require a numerous
representation.  This circumstance
has not the weight of a feather in
my mind.  It is certainly
inadvisable to lodge in 65
representatives, and 26 senators,
unlimited power to establish systems
of taxation, armies, navies, model
the militia, and to do every thing
that may essentially tend soon to
change, totally, the affairs of the
community; and to assemble 1500
state representatives, and 160
senators, to make fence laws and
laws to regulate the descent and
conveyance of property, the
administration of justice between
man and man, to appoint militia
officers, etc.
     It is not merely the quantity
of information I contend for.  Two
taxing powers may be inconvenient;
but the point is, congress, like
the senate of Rome, will have taxing
powers, and the people no check. 
When the power is abused, the people
may complain and grow angry, so may
the state governments; they may
remonstrate and counteract, by
passing laws to prohibit the
collection of congressional taxes. 
But these will be acts of the
people, acts of sovereign power, the
dernier resort unknown to the
constitution; acts operating in
terrorum, acts of resistance, and
not the exercise of any
constitutional power to stop or
check a measure before matured.  A
check properly is the stopping, by
one branch in the same legislature,
a measure proposed by the other in
it.  In fact the constitution
provides for the states no check,
properly speaking, upon the measures
of congress.  Congress can
immediately enlist soldiers, and
apply to the pockets of the people.
     These few considerations bring
us to the very strong distinction
between the plan that operates on
federal principles, and the plan
that operates on consolidated
principles.  A plan may be federal
or not as to its organization each
state may retain its vote or not;
the sovereignty of the state may be
represented, or the people of it.  A
plan may be federal or not as to its
operation-federal when it requires
men and monies of the states, and
the states as such make the laws for
raising the men and monies; not
federal when it leaves the states'
governments out of the question, and
operates immediately upon the
persons and property of the
citizens.  The first is the case
with the confederation; the second
with the new plan.  In the first the
state governments may be [a] check;
in the last none at all. . . .
     It is also said that the
constitution gives no more power to
congress than the confederation,
respecting money and military
matters; that congress under the
confederation, may require men and
monies to any amount, and the states
are bound to comply.  This is
generally true; but, I think . . .
that the states have well founded
checks for securing their liberties. 
I admit the force of the observation
that all the federal powers, by the
confederation, are lodged in a
single assembly.  However, I think
much more may be said in defense
of the leading principles of the
confederation.  I do not object to
the qualifications of the electors
of representatives, and I fully
agree that the people ought to elect
one branch.
     Further, it may be observed,
that the present congress is
principally an executive body, which
ought not to be numerous; that the
house of representatives will be a
mere legislative branch, and being
the democratic on ought to be
numerous.  It is one of the greatest
advantages of a government of
different branches, that each branch
may be conveniently made conformable
to the nature of the business
assigned it, and all be made
conformable to the condition of the
several orders of the people. After
all the possible checks and
limitations we can devise, the
powers of the union must be very
extensive; the sovereignty of the
nation cannot produce the object in
view, the defense and tranquility of
the whole, without such powers,
executive and judicial.  I dislike
the present congress-a single
assembly-because it is impossible to
fit it to receive those powers.  The
executive and judicial powers, in
the nature of things, ought to be
lodged in a few hands; the
legislature in many hands. 
Therefore, want of safety and
unavoidable hasty measures out of
the question, they never can all be
lodged in one assembly properly-it,
in its very formation, must imply a
contradiction.
     In objection to increasing the
representation, it has also been
observed that it is difficult to
assemble a hundred men or more
without making the tumultuous and a
mere mob.  Reason and experience do
not support this observation.  The
most respectable assemblies we have
any knowledge of and the wisest,
have been those, each of which
consisted of several hundred members
- as the senate of Rome, of
Carthage, of Venice, the British
Parliament, etc.  I think I may,
without hazarding much, affirm
that our more numerous state
assemblies and conventions have
universally discovered more wisdom,
and as much order, as the less
numerous ones.  There must
be also a very great difference
between the characters of two or
three hundred men assembled from a
single state, and the characters
of that number or half the number
assembled from all the united
states.
     It is added, that on the
proposed plan the house of
representatives in fifty or a
hundred years will consist of
several hundred members.  The plan
will begin with sixty-five, and we
have no certainty that the number
ever will increase, for this plain
reason-that all that combination of
interests and influence which has
produced this plan, and supported
[it] so far, will constantly oppose
the increase of the representation,
knowing that thereby the government
will become more free and
democratic.  But admitting, after a
few years, there will be a member
for each 30,000 inhabitants, the
observation is trifling; the
government is in a considerable
measure to take its tone from its
early movements, and by means of a
small representation it may in half
of 50 or 100 years, get moved from
its basis, or at least so far as to
be incapable of ever being
recovered.  We ought, therefore, . .
. now to fix the government on
proper principles, and fit to our
present condition.  When the
representation shall become too
numerous, alter it.  Or we may
now make provision, that when the
representation shall be increased to
a given number, that then there
shall be one for each given number
of inhabitants, etc.
     Another observation is, that
congress will have no temptations to
do wrong.  The men that make it must
be very uninformed, or suppose they
are talking to children.  In the
first place, the members will be
governed by all those motives which
govern the conduct of men, and have
before them all the allurements of
offices and temptations to establish
unequal burdens, before described. 
In the second place, they and their
friends, probably, will find it for
their interests to keep up large
armies, navies, salaries, etc., and
in laying adequate taxes.  In the
third place, we have no good grounds
to presume, from reason or
experience, that it will be
agreeable to their characters or
views, that the body of the people
should continue to have power
effectually to interfere in the
affairs of government.  But it is
confidently added, that congress
will not have it in their power to
oppress or enslave the people; that
the people will not bear it.  It is
not supposed that congress will act
the tyrant immediately, and in the
face of daylight.  It is not
supposed congress will adopt
important measures without plausible
pretenses, especially those which
may tend to alarm or produce
opposition.  We are to consider the
natural progress of things-that men
unfriendly to republican equality
will go systematically to work,
gradually to exclude the body of the
people from any share in the
government, first of the substance,
and then of the forms.  The men who
will have these views will not be
without their agents and supporters. 
When we reflect, that a few years
ago we established democratic
republics, and fixed the state
governments as the barriers between
congress and the pickets of the
people, what great progress has been
made in less than seven years to
break down those barriers, and
essentially to change the principles
of our governments, even by the
armless few-is it chimerical to
suppose that in fifteen or twenty
years to come, that much more can be
performed, especially after the
adoption of the constitution, when
the few will be so much better armed
with power and influence, to
continue the struggle?  Probably
they will be wise enough never to
alarm, but gradually prepare the
minds of the people for one specious
change after another, till the final
object shall be obtained.  Say the
advocates, these are only
possibilities.  They are
probabilities a wise people ought to
guard against; and the address made
use of to keep the evils out of
sight, and the means to prevent
them, confirm my opinion.
     But to obviate all objections
to the proposed plan in the last
resort, it is said our people will
be free, so long as they possess the
habits of freemen, and when they
lose them, they must receive some
other forms of government.  To this
I shall only observe, that this is
very humiliating language, and can,
I trust, never suit a manly people
who have contended nobly for
liberty, and declared to the world
they will be free.
         THE FEDERAL FARMER



                          
Antifederalist No. 59

THE DANGER OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
OF ELECTIONS


Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist
#59, addresses this same topic from
an opposing viewpoint.  This essay
was written anonymously by "VOX
POPULI," and appeared in The
Massachusetts Gazette on October 30,
1787.


     . . I beg leave to Jay before
the candid public the first clause
in the fourth section of the first
article of the proposed
Constitution:
     "The times, places and manner
of holding elections, for senators
and representatives, shall be
prescribed in each state by the
legislature thereof; but the
Congress may, at any time, by law,
make or alter such regulations
except as to the places of choosing
senators."
     By this clause, the time, place
and manner of choosing
representatives is wholly at the
disposal of Congress.
     Why the Convention who formed
the proposed Constitution wished to
invest Congress with such a power, I
am by no means capable of saying; or
why the good people of this
commonwealth [Massachusetts] should
delegate such a power to them, is no
less hard to determine.  But as the
subject is open for discussion, I
shall make a little free inquiry
into the matter.
    And, first.  What national
advantage is there to be acquired by
giving them such a power?
     The only advantage which I have
heard proposed by it is, to prevent
a partial representation of the
several states in Congress; "for if
the time, manner and place were left
wholly in the hands of the state
legislatures, it is probable they
would not make provision by
appointing time, manner and place
for an election; in which case there
could be no election, and
consequently the federal government
weakened."
     But this provision is by no
means sufficient to prevent an evil
of that nature.  For will any
reasonable man suppose-that when the
legislature of any state, who are
annually chosen, are so corrupt as
to break thro' that government which
they have formed, and refuse to
appoint time, place and manner of
choosing representatives-I say, can
any person suppose, that a state so
corrupt would not be full as likely
to neglect, or even refuse, to
choose representatives at the time
and place and in the manner
prescribed by Congress?  Surely they
would.  So it could answer no good
national purpose on that account;
and I have not heard any other
national advantage proposed thereby.
    We will now proceed, in the next
place, to consider why the people of
this commonwealth should vest
Congress with such a power.
     No one proposes that it would
be any advantage to the people of
this state.  Therefore, it must be
considered as a matter of
indifference, except there is an
opportunity for its operating to
their disadvantage-in which case, I
conceive it ought to be
disapprobated.
     Whether there is danger of its
operating to the good people's
disadvantage, shall now be the
subject of our inquiry.
     Supposing Congress should
direct, that the representatives of
this commonwealth should be chosen
all in one town, (Boston, for
instance) on the first day of March
- would not that be a very injurious
institution to the good people of
this commonwealth?  Would not there
be at least nine-tenths of the
landed interest of this commonwealth
entirely unrepresented?  Surely one
may reasonably imagine there would. 
What, then, would be the case if
Congress should think proper to
direct, that the elections should be
held at the north-west, south-west,
or north-east part of the state, the
last day of March?  How many
electors would there attend the
business?  And it is a little
remarkable, that any gentleman
should suppose, that Congress could
possibly be in any measure as good
judges of the time, place and manner
of elections as the legislatures of
the several respective states.
     These as objections I could
wish to see obviated.  And I could
wish the public inquiry might extend
to a consideration, whether or not
it would not be more conducive, to
prevent a partial representation, to
invest Congress with power to levy
such a fine as they might think
proper on states not choosing
representatives, than by giving them
this power of appointing time,
manner and place.
     It is objected by some, that
Congress could not levy, or at
least, could not collect, such a
fine of a delinquent state.  If that
is the case, Congress could not
collect any tax they might think
proper to levy, nor execute any
order whatever; but at any time any
state might break through the
national compact, dissolve the
federal constitution, and set the
whole structure afloat on the ocean
of chaos.
     It is, therefore, proposed to
the public to consider, whether the
said clause in the fourth section of
the first article can answer the
only purposes for which it is said
to have been provided, or any other
which will prove any advantage
either to the nation or state.
                   VOX POPULI



                          
Antifederalist No. 60

WILL THE CONSTITUTION PROMOTE THE
INTERESTS OF FAVORITE CLASSES?



John F. Mercer of Maryland was the
author of this essay, taken from his
testimony to members of the
ratifying conventions of New York
and Virginia, 1788, (From the Etting
Collection of the Historical Society
of Pennsylvania.)



     We have not that permanent and
fixed distinction of ranks or orders
of men among us, which unalterably
separating the interests and views,
produces that division in pursuits
which is the great security of the
mixed Government we separated from
and which we now seem so anxiously
to copy.  If the new Senate of the
United States will be really
opposite in their pursuits and views
from the Representatives, have they
not a most dangerous power of
interesting foreign nations by
Treaty [to] support Their views?-for
instance, the relinquishment of the
navigation of [the] Mississippi-and
yet where Treaties are expressly
declared paramount to the
Constitutions of the several States,
and being the supreme law, [the
Senate] must of course control the
national legislature, if not
supersede the Constitution of the
United States itself.  The check of
the President over a Body, with
which he must act in concert-or his
influence and power be almost
annihilated-can prove no great
constitutional security.  And even
the Representative body itself . . .
are not sufficiently numerous to
secure them from corruption.  For
all governments tend to corruption,
in proportion as power concentrating
in the hands of the few, tenders
them objects of corruption to
Foreign Nations and among
themselves.
     For these and many other
reasons we are for preserving the
rights of the State governments,
where they must not be necessarily
relinquished for the welfare of the
Union.  And, where so relinquished,
the line should be definitely drawn. 
If under the proposed Constitution
the States exercise any power, it
would seem to be at the mercy of the
General Government.  For it is
remarkable that the clause securing
to them those rights not expressly
relinquished in the old
Confederation, is left out in the
new Constitution.  And we conceive
that there is no power which
Congress may think necessary to
exercise for the general welfare,
which they may not assume under this
Constitution.  And this
Constitution, and the laws made
under it, are declared paramount
even to the unalienable rights which
have heretofore been secured to the
citizens of these States by their
constitutional compacts. . . .
     Moreover those very powers,
which are to be expressly vested in
the new Congress, are of a nature
most liable to abuse.  They are
those which tempt the avarice and
ambition of men to a violation of
the rights of their fellow citizens,
and they will be screened under the
sanction of an undefined and
unlimited authority.  Against the
abuse and improper exercise of these
special powers, the people have a
right to be secured by a sacred
Declaration, defining the rights
of the individual, and limiting by
them the extent of the exercise. 
The people were secured against the
abuse of those powers by fundamental
laws and a Bill of Rights, under the
government of Britain and under
their own Constitution.  That
government which permits the abuse
of power, recommends it, and will
deservedly experience the tyranny
which it authorizes; for the history
of mankind establishes the truth of
this political adage-that in
government what may be done will be
done.
     The most blind admirer of this
Constitution must in his heart
confess that it is as far inferior
to the British Constitution, of
which it is an imperfect imitation,
as darkness is to light.  In the
British Constitution the rights of
men, the primary object of the
social compact, are fixed on an
immoveable foundation and clearly
defined and ascertained by their
Magna Charta, their Petition of
Rights, their Bill of Rights, and
their effective administration by
ostensible Ministers secures
responsibility.  In this new
Constitution a complicated system
sets responsibility at defiance and
the rights of men neglected and
undefined are left at the mercy of
events.  We vainly plume ourselves
on the safeguard alone of
representation, forgetting that it
will be a representation on
principles inconsistent with true
and just representation; that it is
but a delusive shadow of
representation, proffering in theory
what can never be fairly reduced to
practice.  And, after all,
government by representation (unless
confirmed in its views and conduct
by the constant inspection,
immediate superintendence, and
frequent interference and control of
the people themselves on one side,
or an hereditary nobility on the
other, both of which orders have
fixed and permanent views) is really
only as one of perpetual rapine and
confusion.  Even with the best
checks it has failed in all the
governments of Europe, of which it
was once the basis, except that of
England.
     When we turn our eyes back to
the zones of blood and desolation
which we have waded through to
separate from Great Britain, we
behold with manly indignation that
our blood and treasure have been
wasted to establish a government in
which the interest of the few is
preferred to the rights of the many. 
When we see a government so every
way inferior to that we were born
under, proposed as the reward of
our sufferings in an eight years
calamitous war, our astonishment is
only equaled by our resentment.  On
the conduct of Virginia and New
York, two important States, the
preservation of liberty in a great
measure depends.  The chief security
of a Confederacy of Republics was
boldly disregarded, and the
Confederation violated, by requiring
9 instead of 13 voices to alter the
Constitution.  But still the
resistance of either of these States
in the present temper of America
(for the late conduct of the party
here [Maryland] must open the eyes
of the people in Massachusetts with
respect to the fate of their
amendment) will secure all that we
mean to contend for-the natural and
unalienable rights of men in a
constitutional manner.
     At the distant appearance
of danger to these, we took up arms
in the late Revolution.  And may we
never have cause to look back with
regret on that period when connected
with the Empire of Great Britain, we
were happy, secure and free.